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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

)
)
)
)

NO. 46946-2019
ADA COUNTY NO. CR0l-18-40837

)

)
JAMES MCKINLEY MARSHALL, )
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
James McKinley Marshall pled guilty to one count of possession of methamphetamine.
He received a unified sentence of six years, with one year fixed. Mr. Marshall contends that his
sentence represents an abuse of the district court's discretion, as it is excessive given any view of
the facts.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On June 2, 2018, law enforcement observed a vehicle run a stop sign.
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),1 p.4.)

(Presentence

When law enforcement stopped the vehicle,

driven by James Marshall, the driver granted the officer consent to search the vehicle. (PSI, p.4.)
During the search, the officer located a lock box to which Mr. Marshall provided a key. (PSI,
p.4.)

Inside the box was a substance that tested presumptively positive for methamphetamine

and items of drug paraphernalia. (PSI, p.4.)
Mr. Marshall was charged by information with felony possession of methamphetamine
and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia.

(R., pp.24-25.)

Pursuant to a plea

agreement, Mr. Marshall pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine. (Tr., p.5, L.10 - p.6,
L.14; p.13, Ls.7-22; R., pp.27-35.) According to the terms of the plea agreement, the State
agreed to dismiss the paraphernalia charge and to recommend a sentence of seven years, with
two years fixed, but that the district court retain jurisdiction.

(Tr., p.5, L.10 - p.6, L.14;

R., pp.29, 34.) The State also agreed not to file a persistent violator sentencing enhancement.
(Tr., p.5, L.20.) The district court accepted Mr. Marshall's guilty plea, ordered a PSI, and set the
matter for sentencing. (Tr., p.14, Ls.2-16; R., p.36.)
At sentencing, the State recommended a sentence of seven years, with two years fixed,
with retained jurisdiction.

(Tr., p.16 Ls.19-23.)

Mr. Marshall's counsel asked that he be

sentenced to probation or a rider. (Tr., p.20, L.16 - p.21, L.3.) The district court sentenced

1

Appellant's use of the designation "PSI" includes the packet of documents grouped with the
electronic copy of the PSI, and the page numbers cited shall refer to the corresponding page of
the electronic file.
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Mr. Marshall to six years, with one year fixed. (Tr., p.24, Ls.20 - p.25, L.4; R., pp.44-46.)
Mr. Marshall filed a timely motion for leniency pursuant to I.C.R. 35(b). 2 (R., pp.51-53.)
Mr. Marshall appeals from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.47-49.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Marshall to a unified sentence of
six years, with one years fixed, following his plea of guilty to possession of methamphetamine?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Marshall To A
Unified Sentence Of Six Years, With One Year Fixed, Following His Plea Of Guilty To
Possession Of Methamphetamine
Mr. Marshall asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of six years,
with one year fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed
an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the
record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '" [w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)). In reviewing a trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion, the relevant
inquiry regards four factors:
Whether the trial court: ( 1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.

2

The district court has not yet issued a decision on Mr. Marshall's Rule 35 motion.
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Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).

Mr. Marshall does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Marshall must show that in light of the
governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts.
governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are:

Id.

The

(1) protection of society; (2)

deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
In light of Mr. Marshall's rehabilitative potential, the district court abused its discretion
in sentencing him excessively. The district court failed to consider the fact that Mr. Marshall has
the support of his family, is addicted to methamphetamine, and was truly remorseful.
Mr. Marshall has substantial support and, with programming, Mr. Marshall could likely be
successful in the community. (PSI, pp.IO, 18.) Mr. Marshall has a supportive wife and mother.
(PSI, pp.IO, 18.) Mr. Marshall's wife is ill and he is responsible for monitoring her medication;
he needs to be home to take care of her.

(Tr., p.20, Ls.6-9; p.21, Ls.5-7; p.22, Ls.8-12.)

Mr. Marshall owns a home and he had close to full-time employment. (Tr., p.21, Ls.7-16; p.22,
Ls.2-4; PSI, p.18.)

Therefore, in determining that Mr. Marshall's conduct in possessing

methamphetamine warranted at least a year of incarceration with the Idaho Department of
Correction, the district court failed to reach its decision by the exercise of reason.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered as a
mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, I 03 Idaho
89 (1982). In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a sentence based on Nice's lack of prior
record and the fact that "the trial court did not give proper consideration of the defendant's
alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing the defendant to commit the crime and the
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suggested alternatives for treating the problem.” Id. at 91. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme
Court has ruled that ingestion of drugs and alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate
criminality of conduct, could be a mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414
(1981). Mr. Marshall realizes that he is addicted to methamphetamine. (PSI, p.14.) However,
Mr. Marshall realizes that his drug use has caused him “nothing but problems” and his goal is to
stay sober. (PSI, p.14.) In fact, Mr. Marshall was trying to stay clean at the time of this incident.
(Tr., p.21, Ls.17-19.)

The methamphetamine eventually found in the lockbox was old—

Mr. Marshall had not used methamphetamine for ten months or more. (Tr., p.17, Ls.12-13.) He
had forgotten this methamphetamine was there. (Tr., p.17, Ls.8-12.) Mr. Marshall was making
positive changes in his life—he had even obtained a vehicle and was working on getting his
driver’s license back, which he had not had for thirty years. (Tr., p.22, Ls.2-7.)
Mr. Marshall also has a good employment history.

Mr. Marshall worked for an

amusement business for over seven years. (PSI, p.13.) Thereafter, Mr. Marshall was employed
by Gem State Staffing for over two years and is eligible for rehire there. (PSI, p.13.)
Further, Mr. Marshall expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for his acts.
Mr. Marshall told the presentencing investigator, “I have been trying to stay clean and was for 10
½ months and want to get back [on] the right track. It was stupid and irresponsible and I am
sorry I did it.” (PSI, p.5.) Mr. Marshall said:
Your Honor, I am not the best of people or always known to make [the] right
decisions. What has happened was my fault and [I] should pay consequence but I
have been trying to turn my life around and I have a wonderful wife and a great
job that my boss is proud of me doing which means a lot to me. Drugs have taken
a[ ]lot from me and hurt myself and others and [I] can’t change that w[h]ich has
happened but I would like to change what can be and my wife is [a] big part of
that and if I could just have this one opp[o]rtunity to prove I can [and] I will do
110% to show [you] and other[s] I can and will succeed.
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(PSI, p.16.) Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant expresses
remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593,
595 (1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991). For example, in Alberts, the
Idaho Court of Appeals noted that some leniency is required when the defendant has expressed
“remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and
other positive attributes of his character.” Alberts, 121 Idaho at 209. In Shideler, Idaho Supreme
Court ruled that the prospect of Shideler’s recovery from his poor mental and physical health,
which included mood swings, violent outbursts, and drug abuse, coupled with his remorse for his
actions, was so compelling that it outweighed the gravity of the crimes of armed robbery, assault
with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Shideler,
103 Idaho at 594-95. Therefore, the Court reduced Shideler’s sentence from an indeterminate
term not to exceed twenty years to an indeterminate term not to exceed twelve years. Id. at 593.
Mr. Marshall’s circumstances are somewhat similar to the facts of both Alberts and Shideler in
that he recognizes that he has an addiction to a controlled substance, he wants treatment for his
substance abuse, and he showed considerable remorse for his actions.
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Marshall asserts that the district court
abused its discretion. He asserts that had the district court properly considered his family
support, good employment history, controlled substances addiction, and his remorse, it would
have imposed a less severe sentence.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Marshall respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 31 st day of July, 2019.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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